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The numerous debates, analysis and various writings, both at the practical level of 
politics and within academic institutions across several continents, about the 
‘globalisation’ of liberal capitalism have prompted numerous arguments concerning its 
validity as a solution that stimulates development, enhances harmonisation between 
states and promotes a irreversible partnership between governmental and market actors 
(Waters, 1995). This paper attempts to de-mystify some of the myths and claims about 
the essence of the global political economy, by analysing the ideological transformation 
of capitalism since the demise of the dollar system and the decline of the Soviet Union, 
and the growth of superstructural institutions that have complemented this shift. Thus, 
this analysis will use a neo-Gramscian framework and borrows from the work of 
scholars such as Mark Rupert, Robert Cox, Stuart Hall and Kelley Lee (Rupert, 1995, 
2000; Cox, 1987, 1996; Hall, 1988, 2000; Lee, 1995) to demonstrate how neo-liberal 
economic globalisation has been legitimated through a series of inter-connected 
agencies, that have either or a combination of material, cultural, institutional or political 
attitudes, which each seek to contribute and consolidate the overall ideological structure. 
In addition, I will illustrate how states, and political parties – in particular those Parties, 
formed historically as an ideological counter-weight to liberal capitalism, have 
responded in their acceptance of the norms of globalisation.
Before embarking upon an analysis of the overriding parts that make up the 
hegemonic neoliberal project, it is of interest to firstly examine how scholars from 
within both the neo-Gramscian school and from other critical discourses within IPE 
have understood its development. (Abbott and Worth, 2002). Historically, the current 
global political set-up can be historically interpreted in various forms. However, three 
different historical perspectives seem to stand out more explicitly. Firstly the emergence 
of the global spread of neoliberalism can be seen merely as the exhaustion of the post-
war contract. Here, the embracement the free market has severed the stability of the 
Fordist form of social partnership, and as a result has left itself increasingly vulnerable, 
with cracks provided space for forms of restructuring. (Gill and Mittelman, 1995; Gills, 
2000). Alternatively it can be viewed more comprehensively as a form of neoliberalism 
that has managed to shed the regulated forms of post-war Keynesian towards a more 
globalised form of liberalism. A historic bloc is thus being constructed via institutions 
(GATT, World Bank) that were founded in the aftermath of Bretton Woods, but have 
taken greater emphasis since the end of the cold war and have been strengthened by new 
institutions such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Thus by adapting institutions, 
that emerged from Bretton Woods under nouveau free trade institutions, the hegemonic 
world order is being transformed towards a more economically liberal set of social 
norms, that can be seen to promote ‘globalisation’. This transformation, as Mark Rupert 
stresses is occurring without the collaboration of organized labour institutions, that was 
prominent in the Keynesian era:
Although it has turned on its erstwhile junior partners in organized 
industrial labour, and turned from the “productive capital concept” 
toward the laissez-faire fundamentalism characteristic of finance 
capital, the historic bloc pushing contemporary transnational liberalism 
nonetheless retains a fundamental continuity with the political project 
of the post-war hegemonic bloc. (Rupert, 2000: p. 49)
2From this, one could further argue that the foundations, laid at Bretton Woods 
were, if not consciously geared in some way towards a more open form of liberalism, 
more akin to the vision of Smith, than that of Keynes. For while the purpose of the 
Bretton-Woods institutions was to combine the principles of liberal trade within a 
framework of planning and regulation, the applications of institutions such as the IMF 
and GATT set a liberal agenda that was always likely to present a confliction, or in 
Habermas’ words a ‘legitimation crisis’ (Habermas, 1976), in which the expansion of 
the market and institutional encouragement of private capital would conflict with the 
corporate-mixed economic form of regulation. Thus, the interpretation of the post-
Bretton Woods order can be seen as the continuation or a ‘maturing’ of a post-war 
liberalisation project that has historically transformed away from a cautious approach 
towards a more orthodox application of liberal economics. As Rupert continues:
Whilst the growth-originated “corporate liberalism” of the post-war 
decade and the hard-edged neoliberalism of more recent times may 
disagree on the terms of international openness, both share an 
underlying commitment to a more open world economy based on 
private ownership of the means of production and generalized 
commodity exchange. (Rupert, 2000: p. 49)
Thirdly and finally, the ‘hyper liberal’ form of production that has emerged since 
the 1970s can be seen as being a distinct break from the post-war order. This notion 
points to the idea that a new historic bloc has been constructed, which has institutionally 
and societally consented to a new form of market deregulation and the acceptance that 
private capital is a more reliable form of wealth production than state intervention. 
Within this outlook, financial transnationalism and ‘globalisation’ are viewed as both 
inevitable and irreversible. At the practical level of politics, social democratic parties 
have thus felt the compulsion to embrace the free market conditions, which they 
formerly rejected and now reinvent themselves within the inescapable realities of global 
liberalism. (Giddens, 1998). Following this scenario, the formulation of the WTO can be 
interpreted as a sign that a new hegemonic order has been fashioned; one with 
distinguishably different aims, objectives and norms from that of the post-war age. In 
other words, rather than a process of reconstruction, a hegemonic transformation has 
occurred within the last twenty or so years.
Some forms of historical explanation for this shift is discussed (although 
unfortunately not in much depth and without clarity) by Cox. He draws back to the 
innovations provided by Polanyi, and points to his outline of the rise and fall of the 
liberal state in the 19th Century to understand the current historical context (Cox, 1996). 
Polanyi depicted the concept of a double movement. In the first stage of a double 
movement, the state retreats from economic regulation, while in the second stage the 
state reacts to this from ‘below’, resulting in a return of the state as an active player in 
the economy and the development of welfarism. The return of the free market logic can 
thus be seen in terms of a crisis of this second phrase. (Cox, 1996; Polanyi, 1944) For 
Cox, Polanyi’s model has now gone full circle and the global economy is currently back 
at the first phrase of this movement, but with processes such as globalisation this is now 
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assertions may contradict slightly from the form of historicism illustrated in Power, 
Production and World Orders, it seems to point to the theoretical assertion that a 
separate historic bloc has emerged, which in character embraces the market to the same 
extent as Victorian experimenters in the aftermath of the industrial revolution. 
Whether depicted as a reconstruction of post-war liberalism, or as a distinct 
historical transformation from Keynesianism, the structural norms, practices and 
agencies of the current age differ greatly in character from the corporate and regulatory 
set-up that emerged after Bretton-Woods. In order to assess this character in hegemonic 
terms it is necessary to take a closer look at these differing super-structural aspects that 
hold its totality together. 
GLOBALISATION
Observed through the lens of an intertwining of economic and socio-cultural practices 
between differing states, globalisation has emerged since the cold war as the unique 
buzzword that describes the widespread process that has resulted from the ‘triumph of 
capitalism’. Such is its supposed might, that scholars and governments alike have come 
to accept its dynamics as a new irreversible phase of capitalism, one to which both states 
and economic entities need to adapt. (Krugman, 1999; Giddens, 1998). In addition, 
global institutions have been constructed to aid the realisation of these processes. The 
conclusion of the Uruguay round, the eighth round of trade negotiations since the 
formation of GATT, saw the largest commitment to and acceptance of the global free 
trade agenda, that propelled GATT to new heights of global economic importance. 
Whilst the goals of the Uruguay round were set extremely high by ambitious neoliberal 
pragmatists at its inauguration, its final results met well over half of these goals, 
resulting in perhaps the most extensive set of multilateral negotiations undertaken by 
any body in history. (Jackson, 1994)
At its finale the Uruguay round liberalised the processes of trade in a number of 
interrelated areas, including a drastic mandate for trade negotiations within services, a 
multilateral agreement on international property, a higher scrutinisation of international 
trading standards, huge advances in the concentration of ‘market access’ and following 
from that a general requirement that all countries construct schedules for tariff reduction 
and global integration. (Jackson, 1994; May, 2000). In addition it became noticeable that 
financial services were to figure for the first time, within the agenda of multilateral trade 
negotiations, with calls made since, for a multilateral agreement for further liberalisation 
of trade within banking circles. (Akyuz, 1994) The flagship, however of the Uruguay 
round was the creation of the World Trade Organisation, which was devised structurally 
to oversee the practices of global trade. Institutionally constructed within differing 
councils, the WTO signified not just a new phrase of capitalism in terms of trade 
liberalism, but, by its induction from GATT negotiations, it demonstrated that states 
realised the need that the changing economic climate required institutional recognition. 
Thus, the WTO places itself as the ‘regulator’ of the globalisation process.
Before discussing ways in which the WTO works as an agency to implement the 
consolidation of the global hegemonic order, it is necessary to assess what impact it has 
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would seem to follow that the construction of the WTO and its rhetorical commitment 
towards trade liberation and tariff reduction demonstrates a willingness, on behalf of the 
state to accept the ‘new realities’ of globalisation and to concede some of its sovereign 
rights in order to recognise these dynamics (Drucker, 1989; Hutton, 1995). Likewise, the 
state is being transformed as a social entity by the emerging authority of the global 
market. In Gramscian terms the WTO serves as a tool that enhances and consolidates the 
overriding hegemonic order. It thus promotes the concept of globalisation towards a 
higher form of saturated consciousness, which both at the economic and the socio-
cultural level appears as the norm. It is within this form that globalisation appears as a 
‘story’ within global political economy (Palan, 2001). The story being that globalisation 
is an external natural force that determines and modifies the behaviour of both States 
and Multi-national corporations. On the contrary, globalisation can only be seen as a 
socio-economic formation, which reinforced by global institutions appears natural, but 
in reality is a product of the construction of consensual common sense (to use Gramsci’s 
definition), that has emerged between key actors within the global arena. The mythology 
of globalisation produces the illusion that individual states are unable to challenge its 
legitimacy and that global institutional, market regionalism and co-operation are the 
only available options to achieve forms of stability and harmony between states and the 
workings of the market (Gilpin, 1987; Keohane, 1984; Krasner, 1983). It is within this 
illusion that states develop their differing forms of policy. In terms of competition, and 
reiterated by competition State theory (Cerny, 1990; Strange, 1994; Palan and Abbott, 
1995), states have thus shifted their interests towards the neoliberal global market and to 
multilateral arenas, where under the banner of G7 and GATT, the hegemonic norms and 
rules are realised. The hegemonic character consolidated at the global institutional level 
is then reflected at the level of domestic policy with social policies, as well as monetary 
and fiscal policy increasingly taking an appearance that reflects the macro conditions of 
international competitiveness (Palan and Abbott, 1995). 
The complexities of globalisation are therefore not founded within an external 
economic force to which states are compelled to adapt, but are paradoxically founded 
upon the construction of a set of common hegemonic norms, which states play a 
substantial part in creating. Once founded states aid and strengthen the norms by 
supporting the construction of further agents that act as consolidators within the 
hegemonic process. These agents, some of which (such as trans-media blocs) are located 
within the cultural realm of civil society, respond by gaining a foothold and with it 
different forms of hegemonic autonomy within the world order. It is from this 
development that the ‘illusion’ of globalisation is created, and states adopt the TINA 
(there is no alternative) strategy.
The WTO presents itself as a central agent within this process. Although a forum 
in which states negotiate, the WTO takes on a full-time role as a primary non-State 
organisation that serves to strengthen the hegemonic projects of globalisation and 
neoliberalism. Whilst the WTO is an organised, visibly evident, institutional super-
structural agent, it is only one of many that exist within the hegemonic set-up. Others 
exist either as economic entities, or as socio-cultural entities, both of which promote and 
reinforce the overall ideology. It is thus essential to outline some of these key non-state 
agencies to gain a better understanding of the current global order.
5The ideological role of the WTO 
Since its inception in 1995, the WTO has attracted full membership from 140 nation-
states, with 34 (including Russia and China1) more taking role of ‘observer’ states, 
which are expected to gain full membership within five years. In addition 
representatives from other key organisations, such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and World Bank also oversee the institutional processes (WTO, 2000). The WTO 
not only serves to provide a forum to maintain and aid the continuity of the global free 
market, but provides an intellectual platform for free market scholars to construct ideas 
that aim to demonstrate that free trade is not only the ‘correct way forward’, but that 
properly applied, it can be effectively used for poverty alleviation. (Nordstrom, 2000). 
Within the mind-set of the WTO only two forms of trading mechanisms exist, the free 
trade model, which both promotes freedom of movement and technological innovation, 
and the Protectionist model, that allows governmental intervention which holds up the 
process of material development. No real gain is taken from the second model, as 
despite the state subsidisation ‘jobs and factories are lost’ as companies turn ‘bloated 
and inefficient, supplying customers with outdated, unattractive products’ (WTO, 2000). 
Thus for the actors within the WTO, free trade is the only viable universal working 
option that can provide long-term answers towards both development and wealth 
creation. Dismissed are the mixed-economic models that found popularity after the war, 
as they held back the comprehensive liberalisation process. Whilst differing degrees of 
mixed-economies attempted to provide some form of shield that protected workers from 
the potentially derogatory effects of trade liberalisation, the hegemonic project that the 
WTO seeks to promote aims to demonstrate that to achieve the real societally liberating 
benefits of trade, minimum restrictions and state interference are paramount. Whilst 
state intervention may serve to provide short-term relief, by protecting employment and 
by creating welfare services, in the long term, their actions stifled the ‘liberating effects’ 
that greater marketisation can provide. Following on from this, the ‘neoliberal’ logic 
suggests that greater economic liberalisation, allows citizens greater freedom in the 
workplace, as they are not necessarily confined to ‘one job for life’. Greater ‘freedom’ is 
thus interpreted in terms of greater self-autonomy that allows the individual more choice 
of movement, and society as a whole more fluidity from the class boundaries created by 
the state. 
The working formula within the WTO is geared towards reducing both poverty 
and unemployment through the application of trade liberalisation. In ideological terms, 
scholars, co-operative think-tanks, pressure groups working on behalf of businesses, and 
policy-advises, that work in tandem with participatory states, all cite examples where 
trade liberalisation within countries has resulted in a stronger economy alongside lower 
unemployment and poverty alleviation. In addition they seek to demonstrate that cases 
in which ‘successful’ liberalisation projects are undermined by examples where the 
negative effects outweigh the positive ones. These negative effects, they claim, are often 
a temporary or transitionary phenomenon, which provide a more feasible outcome over 
time. Furthermore more stark negativities (such as the effects that have resulted from the 
1
 China gained full membership to the WTO in September, 2001.
6programmes of ‘shock policies’ in Yelsin’s Russia) have resulted not from marketisation 
itself, but from the failure of the state to ‘open up’ its economy sooner and/or correctly:
It is difficult to generalize about how deep and how durable transition 
losses will be. One needs to know about the specific circumstances of 
the affected sectors. It does seem likely however, that costs will be 
greater the more protected the sector originally was and the greater the 
shock. (Winter, 2000) 
In this respect the main purpose of the WTO is to act as an ‘educatory tool’ 
focussing on ‘educating’ state participants and members of the public in general that 
classical economic liberalism is the ‘correct’ way forward, and any revision through 
either state intervention or protection merely leads to a step back in developmental and 
wealth creation. Furthermore the literature and rhetoric surrounding the organisation 
points to an ideological agenda that hails the wisdom of the classical liberal theories of 
the 17th and 18th century and critiques any influential theory that has emerged since that 
aims to dilute the benefits which Smith and Ricardo sought to deliver (WTO, 2000).
In hegemonic terms the main significance of the formation of the WTO is that it 
appears as a global agent that has been organically created by neoliberal principles. 
Whilst other global institutions, that have emerged since the Second World War have 
adopted some flexibility in terms of their ideological practicality, the WTO’s mandate 
has metaphorically heralded a hegemonic shift towards neoliberalism. In turn, its central 
position to oversee the economic practises of states and its promotion of the global 
political economy has led to these other, more established institutions to fully endorse its 
project. It also aims to consolidate the legitimisation of neoliberalism by setting global 
standards and norms to which states are strongly advised to adhere. This is not to stress 
that the WTO acts as an independent super-national body, geared towards reducing the 
powers of the state in order that it applies with its own mandate, as its existence and 
policy-making structure was a result of state autonomy itself, but that it exists as an 
entity that both aids the consolidation of the neoliberal order, and saturates its 
hegemonic agenda.
The hegemonic shift in the economic ideology of International Organisations
In tandem with the creation of the WTO and the renewed emphasis upon the GATT 
regime, other ‘democratic’ organisations, within the family of the United Nations2 have 
also moved towards a consensual acceptance of neoliberal principles. For, whilst the 
1970s provided participatory nations, (especially those from the more developing world) 
a chance to challenge the legitimacy of the post-war consensus that was developed at the 
end of the Second World War, by the late 1980s, developing nations began to accept the 
liberalising mandate that had swept through the west during the decade (Lee, 1995). 
Here the differing UN agencies have taken similar developments since the 1970s, but 
consequently all have resulted in accepting the hegemonic project which economic 
agencies, MNC’s, global financial institutions and states alike have all combined to 
fashion. In this way these differing global ‘cause’ agencies are, by accepting and 
2
 By the family here I include the ‘development’ agencies, such as UNICEF, UNESCO and the WHO, and 
well as the economic funding suppliers such as the IMF and the World Bank.
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strength and consolidation. They can thus be seen as further jigsaw pieces within the 
economic liberalising project.
More focus on the recent development of agendas within agencies of the UN can 
furthermore strengthen the claim that they have added to the overall jigsaw of 
neoliberalism and re-emphasises Gramsci’s own theoretical models of hegemonic 
consolidation. The contestations of the existing norms and the democratising 
programmes that were endorsed by the less developed nations inside the UN in the 
1970s, intended to place a new mandate upon both the running of the global economy 
and development, and became diluted by the major industrial nations’ hold upon the 
workings of the global political economy (Gill, 1989; Worth, 2002). This became even 
more important with the increase in transnational business transaction that saw a growth 
in private western investment in economies of those nations intent upon reform, and the 
end of the Cold War; that promoted a seemingly universal conception of global liberal 
democracy (Fukuyama, 1992). The results have seen both governments and 
development agencies increase their democratic power within the UN, in terms of 
enforcing the one-nation one-vote precedent, but accepting the liberal economic 
framework of the global economy, and, more importantly, restricting its aims and 
objectives well within that framework. This move has been aided by the concept and the 
multi-complexual interpretations of the relevance of globalisation. For new incentives 
promoted by the World Bank have suggested that globalisation can be used as a 
mechanism, not just for global poverty reduction and development, but also to promote 
forms of civil and democratic society (World Bank, 2000). The World Bank’s structural 
adjustment programmes have highlighted this strategy for ‘progressive globalisation’.
Supported by key UN agencies, such as the International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World 
Health Organization (WHO), these programmes have focussed upon the need for private 
investment within their differing developmental strategies (Lee, 1995). In terms of 
action, it is envisaged that profit-driven multinational firms can work alongside public 
agencies within the state to combine to both regulate internal markets, and at the same 
time to maximise competition. Therefore commodities and technology which are seen as 
essential for developmental purposes (such as medicines and technological machinery
etc) can be attainable in lesser-developed countries. UN agencies have moved to 
embrace globalisation and neoliberalism, forging a working consensus with economic 
institutions. For example, the WHO proposed a radical mandate for action in the 1970s, 
by demanding a global strategy ensuring that health treatment could be accessible to all. 
Perceived initially as a challenge to the core beliefs and interests that were maintained 
by western nations, the WHO’s ‘health for all’ programme was conceived and 
demanded by the less developed countries to promote a genuine alternative towards 
poverty alleviation (Worth, 2002). The emergence of global neoliberalism and the 
changing nature of the international political economy however, have propelled the 
WHO towards a position that favours the support of private actors and marketisation, in 
the overall application of the ‘health for all’ strategy. Globalisation, is thus viewed by 
the WHO as a ‘better force for global health’, re-iterating the same positive light that is 
evident from within the WTO.
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formulation of the building of a historic bloc. For if the key economic institutions within 
the global arena have been devised to reflect the core ideologies, beliefs and norms that 
have emerged from the dominant social classes within western society, then its support 
from lesser developed nations with different agendas (notable towards development), 
has to be maintained through certain concessions. Equally if, within the UN as a whole, 
economic action is to be framed around those very principles prescribed by the western-
dominated ideologies within these institutions, then these must be made attractive to the 
lesser-developed countries, in order that they comply with the aids and objectives of the 
differing developmental agencies. The crisis in post-war hegemony, in the 1970s thus 
provided challenges for the less developed and the state socialist nations to use the UN 
development agencies to construct alternatives. The drive towards neoliberalism 
however formulised a new economic project within the west, which gained the consent 
from the lesser developed countries and subsequently from development agencies, when 
the neoliberalism project was devised in such a way as to be beneficial to the processes 
of development and universal economic growth. Hence the recent drives by the World 
Bank and the WTO alike to make developmental projects a top priority, demonstrate 
that it is plausible to suggest that free trade is essential for improved development and 
for global stability (World Bank, 2001; 2000). A fashioning of the cementation of 
hegemony and the construction of a new characterised historic bloc can thus be 
observed. For in Gramscian terms, a successful hegemonic order requires the acceptance 
and consent of the subaltern social classes so that its overall legitimacy is ensured 
(Gramsci, 1971). Through the shift in policies within development agencies inside the 
UN, which states have democratically voted towards and accepted, the overall global 
political economy is being continuingly legitimised and normalised, which has added to 
harmonisation within the UN, and an overall strengthening of the neoliberal order.
The Impact of MNC’s 
The continued rise and subsequent economic involvement of MNCs upon the affairs of 
both global and domestic markets have sparked considerable debate amongst scholars 
within IPE. It is not my intention here however to contribute towards an evaluation of 
how much power the MNCs have upon political economies, or how much this power 
has encroached upon national sovereignty. Whilst this debate has drawn attention since 
their prominence as a force was recognised by Kindleberger in the 1970s (Kindleberger, 
1970), from both positivists and critical theorists alike (Said and Simmons, 1975; 
Strange, 1996), their relevance here is merely to place them as hegemonic agents within 
the world order. For within the discourse of the neoliberal project, the MNC play a 
critical role, both it terms of its practice and ideology. Multinational investment has a 
two-fold positive effect to the orthodox neo-liberal. Firstly, MNC generated investment 
provides a ‘democratic’ action, by lessening the extent the role the state has in 
determining the economy, thus contributing to democratic processes within a state, and 
considerably reducing any possibilities of totalitarianism and dictatorship. Secondly, it 
provides less developed countries greater potential for wealth creation, which in turn 
provides an improved standard of living for its citizens, aids societal concerns such as 
health and education (and as mentioned above these sentiments are reflection by 
participatory international organisations) and provides a real impetus for development. 
9Indeed it has been argued that multinational investment have done a great deal more 
than states and international aid organisations alike to address the problems of 
underdevelopment and as multinational firms have sought to move their manufacturing 
plants to ‘cheaper nations’ then there are additional arguments that MNCs have also 
provided the only ‘fair’ and ‘viable’ option for wealth redistribution. 
One of the first apostles that aspired to the positive effects of MNCs was Axel 
Madsen. Writing in 1980, when there was more optimism that the ‘free world’ would 
provide developmental relief through capitalism, Madsen interpreted the rise of 
multinational corporations as with one that would have the effect to silence those 
inward-looking pragmatists, thus reducing national isolationism and increasing global 
innovation for science and technology. He also stresses that Multinational Corporations 
do play a ‘moral’ role as they place an equal objective for growth and profit. This, he 
argues quashes the argument that Multinational Corporations merely exist as selfish 
actors, as this balance (between growth and profit) is a central feature of multinational 
development, with growth often placed as a priority, suggesting that the societal benefits 
provided by firms often outweigh the capital gains that individual firms made 
themselves (Madsen, 1980).
In practice the combined effects of the rise of multinational activity and 
deregulatory measures pursued by host governments have greatly reduced corporate 
working partnerships with labour unions, which (at least in Western Europe and the US) 
became the hallmark of the post-war order. Increased market-driven competition has left 
unions within nation-states redundant, with governments favouring to break off 
coalitions with unions in order to encourage MNC investment. Such has been the 
significance of capital from multinational investment, that governmental policy and 
governmental consciousness has moved to a position that views social welfare and 
corporate regulation as being detrimental to the overall labour market activity. Labour 
interests are increasingly seen not in terms of representation of union demands, but as 
extending the competition of the labour market, that can only be effectively motivated 
by encouraging more intensive development from MNCs. The MNC has therefore acted 
to reinforce a renewal of the Smithian logic that the division of labour is essential for 
prosperous economic growth and this division of labour is ‘limited by the extent of the 
market’, with less limitations on the market providing greater stimulus for a larger 
division (Smith, 1998). Such principles fuel more concentration to extend the global 
market in order to increase both investment and to stimulate labour opportunities. This 
marked shift in economic ideology has resulted in a lessening of intervention into the 
national economy by the state, allowing MNCs to firmly strengthen their position in the 
world economy and subsequently as an actor within the hegemonic order. 
As a form of contributing agent, the MNC also acts as a form of balancer that 
serves to further ‘normalise’ both the global economy and greatly aids its expansion. It 
doing so it provides not only an economic harmony to the uneven workings of the global 
political economy in general, but also supplies socio-cultural traits, which furthers the 
debates and conceptions of the nature of ‘globalisation’. Economically, they have aided 
the transition of international market towards a fully integrated global system that has 
more control, substance and structure than former international economic arenas. 
Stephen Hymer sums this up:
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The multinational corporation, because of its great power to plan 
economic activity, represents an important step forward over previous 
methods of organizing international exchange. It demonstrates the 
social nature of production on a global scale. As it eliminates the 
anarchy of international markets and brings about a more extensive 
and productive international division of labour, it releases great 
sources of latent energy. (Hymer, 1979).
Culturally, the relevance of Multinational Corporations has provided a large 
majority of the hype that is found within the language of globalisation. The global 
spread of products within the service, fashion and entertainment industries have led to 
widespread acknowledgements that such products have been homogenised at a global 
level (Tomlinson, 1991). Whilst it is not the place here to discuss the different empirical 
and theoretical studies of the many cultural factors that MNCs have brought to far 
reaching places across the globe, any study of the nature of hegemony and a 
cementation of a neoliberal historic bloc required some mention of how structural agents 
strengthen the ideological function of a global order. Thus it should be reinforced that 
the ranges of commercial products that have found a global market have forged cultural 
harmonies. Whilst much has been made within cultural studies of the growing 
‘McDonaldisation’, spurred on by the successful growth of multi-national products, 
global firms have also increased their growing global recognition by advertising such 
products through different national television networks and communication outlets 
(which I discuss in depth below). MNCs have also managed to secure various 
sponsorship deals with certain entertainments and sporting events that have become 
increasingly global in content, whilst similar deals have been made with an assortment 
of ‘sporting’ and ‘entertainment’ figures, with companies parading these figures in 
regions where they are best known, in order that greater profit and fashionable appeal 
can be obtained.
Thus, in terms of hegemony, MNC’s have served to bind together the neoliberal 
ideology, by applying the logic of transnational free trade and exploiting it for their own 
gain. They have strengthened their own position as an actor upon the world stage even 
further when states and institutions have responded in favour for their development, 
setting down laws and reforms that have encouraged their expansion. MNC’s should not 
be viewed upon as a new phenomenon that has risen from the end of the Second World 
War, with an agenda to limit the power of the state, as the industrial revolution, the 
British-inspired era of laissez-faire liberalism and the era of Imperialism all legitimated 
oversees business expansion in different ways (Kozul-Wright, 1994). Rather MNC’s 
have successfully taken account of the crisis of the post-war Keynesian settlement to 
increase their position and function within the global economy and to invite 
governments to forge an ideological and practical coalition with them. As business 
entities, the MNC’s main aims are to maximise its own profits and growth, while it is 
the state and other representative governmental bodies that have made the economic 
environment more favourable to expansion. This growth has thus greater aiding to the 
‘globalising’ factors, which have become identifiable with technological and 
communicative advancements that have added to the ‘myth’ that the process of 
globalisation is an irreversible ‘natural’ phenomenon. However, as a hegemonic agent 
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the triumph of the growth of the MNC has combined to create a core ideological 
structure, in which no feasible alternative is considered as viable by its ruling strata.
THE RISE OF TRANSNATIONAL MEDIA AND THE NETWORK SOCIETY
Any form of hegemonic structure requires a media and communication formulation that 
1) acts as a communicative agent that functions under and promotes the overall 
ideological framework and 2) contributes to the practices of that overall framework by 
strengthening its own commercial and economic position. This formulation can be 
applied to any form of hegemonic global order, whilst the behaviour and action of the 
media often being dependent upon the nature of the order itself. For example in 
historical periods, where state protectionism has been a prominent factor, the media has 
generally applied a more inwardly, nationalist outlook, whilst prior to the development 
of the printed media, more direct forms of communication, often coupled with educative 
actions were employed that both served to strengthen the existing order and to form a 
harmonious relationship with the masses. Indeed, communication theorists have often 
commented that no form of social and political order would be possible without
communication and the media of some kind, no matter what its form (Seymour-Ure, 
1974).
Pluralists since Weber have been quick to argue that media groups act as 
pressures groups that work to limit the power of the state. For them, media 
democratisation, globalisation and the rise of the network society has opened up real 
opportunities for further democratising movements in more authoritarian states. 
However, whilst there are definite disparities between the ways in which different 
nations organise their media, all contribute in some way towards the legitimation of 
economic neoliberalism. For, whilst authoritarian nations, such as China use the power 
of the state itself to communicate to its citizen the need for economic liberalisation, the 
more democratic systems in the west still share the common ideological goal that 
propels them as additional agents for both the socio-cultural preservation and the 
transportation of neoliberal hegemony. Whilst there has to be some concession and 
acknowledgement that dissident voices do find their way into almost all privately-owned 
media outlets and that diversity does exist to reflect differing evaluative outlooks, the 
global media as an organising force plays a considerable part in the consolidation of the 
global economy. The observation of the importance of a popular press within a 
hegemonic relationship was identified by Gramsci himself and has been made relevant 
to the present-day by many of his modern-day apostles in the field of communication 
and cultural studies (Hall et al, 2000). Upon the importance of the media and the press, 
Gramsci wrote:
A study of how the ideological structure of a dominant class is actually 
organised: namely the material organization aimed at maintaining, 
defending, and developing the theoretical or ideological ‘front’. Its 
most prominent and dynamic part is the press in general: publishing 
houses (which have an implicit and explicit programme and are 
attached to a particular tendency), political newspapers, periodicals of 
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every kind, scientific, literary, philosophical, popular etc., various 
periodicals down to the parish bulletins… The Press is the most 
dynamic of this ideological structure, but not the only one. (Gramsci, 
1985: p. 389).
Writing from the perspective of the first half of the twentieth century, Gramsci 
here sets out a sketch of the relevance of the media to societal relations, which he then 
places within a more critical and theoretical framework in the Prison Notebooks 
(Gramsci, 1971). What appears of interest here is that by locating media and 
communication within the structures of a historic bloc, a form of universality is reached 
that was lacking in some of the more critical aspects of Marx’s own works. In today’s 
world this universality is recognised not just by the emergence of a secure transnational 
media system, which has heightened its position from the many large-scale media 
mergers of the 1990s, but by the growth of information technology and in particular the 
Internet. Any universal theory that applies a certain medium to a unifying form of 
purpose does have some shortcomings, demonstrated by the fact that both the media and 
the Internet provide contrasting functions that vary within different parts of the global 
community. However, as indicated above, Gramsci’s own musings aid us to understand 
how media and communications industries provide a key contribution towards the 
consolidation of hegemony. Studies also show, and this is particularly relevant to the 
largely unregulated confines of cyberspace, that the contradictions of the hegemonic 
order are also exploited. For whilst the Internet adds to the socio-economic formulation 
of neoliberal practices, it also create a forum in which dissident views and support can 
be voiced, leading to possibilities of contestation and avenues for counter-hegemony. 
The Global Media and Murdochisation 
The upsurge in commercial media mergers in the 1980s and 1990s was reflected in 
tandem with the general growth of MNCs in that period. Whilst, as noted above, states 
still have the predominant policy-making right to decide upon its own terms for the way 
that their Media and Communication industry are managed, the general universal trend 
is towards deregulation and market liberalisation in different forms (Herman and 
McChesney, 1997). Financial institutions such as the IMF and WTO have also 
encouraged this position, with the IMF endorsing a policy that relates the commercial 
media industry to the needs of the global market, and the WTO encouraging the move 
towards a single global market for the commercial media (Herman and McChesney, 
1997). Regional trading agreements also seem to reflect this, with NAFTA in particular 
determined to open up markets within their respective communities. The EU has 
generally taken the same stance, although there has been a great deal more reluctance 
towards further deregulation, with the issue of media concentration attracting concern in 
certain quarters (Hamelink, 1994). 
The environment of deregulation and the increase in global competitiveness has 
led large-scale media firms to increase their significance and size and to exploit 
technological development, such as satellite communication for their own commercial 
ends. Furthermore, their reliance upon advertising and commercialism has sidelined 
those firms that were either state-subsidised or run on a non-profit basis. This has led to 
a double-effect in which the profit-making mode of communication is legitimised and 
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normalised on the global stage and is held up as a model for continued development. 
National media outlets are thus forced to find extra revenue to continue by either forging 
an alliance with one of the large trans-media conglomerates, or reforming sufficiently so 
that they are able to compete in some way within the market. 
In terms of actual media concentration, Herman and McChesney argue that no 
more than ten or so media conglomerates hold the vast majority of interest within the 
global media, which are prominently, based, or formed, within the USA (Herman and 
McChesney, 1997). Perhaps the most ambitious and renowned of these is News 
Corporation. Identified with its figurehead and leading stockholder, Rupert Murdoch, 
News Corporation provides the most useful case study for identifying the spread of the 
socio-economic and cultural ideology for neoliberal hegemony. With media holdings in 
six continents, Murdoch’s empire consists of television networks, satellite services, 
newspapers, publishing outlets and radio stations, that pays the greatest attention to the 
US, UK, Australia and East Asia. The style and dynamics in which News operates 
demonstrates insights into the workings of a media-based MNC and how it relates to 
different state regulations and to politics in general. For example, in the US, News has 
successfully ‘played the corporate game’, by setting out its stall to win over 
governmental and public officials within Federal government. This has resulted in 
several favourable rulings that have allowed the further expansion of Murdoch 
experiments within the US. Perhaps a greater demonstration of his influence came 
within the UK. After successfully gaining an enterprising foothold within the UK, and 
then forming an alliance with Thatcher in the 80s to gain exemption from EU laws so 
that he could further monopolise News’ position, one of his more notorious publications, 
the Sun Newspaper, unleashed a collection of furious attacks on the Labour Party during 
the run up to the 1992 general election (Crewe and Gosschalk, 1994), fearing that if 
elected such privileges would be harder to obtain and his own interests might be effected 
through tax increase and a higher scrutiny of regulation. Subsequently, the Conservative 
Party was re-elected, prompting comments from both parties that Murdoch’s influence 
became a critical factor in determining the result. In China, however, where Murdoch 
has opened up new areas in the emerging market climate, News has forged its growing 
significance through persistence and ‘respect’ for the Chinese rulers. After filtering in 
television channels for the Chinese audiences, through its other Asian networks, under 
the watchful guide of the Chinese authorities, News has furthered its viewing figures by 
extra entertainment/sport channels, winning the much-needed backing from the 
government. One of the most paradoxically bizarre News projects is the collaboration of 
the founding of an Internet site in 1997, with the People’s Daily, the Communist Party 
Newspaper (Herman and McChesney, 1997).
What remains relevant here is that the global media have managed to combine 
with other agents to form an ideological alliance that transforms their major purpose as 
being the socio-cultural communicators of neoliberalism. Murdoch’s News Corporation 
provides a telling example of that, for whilst it either consciously, or sub-consciously 
promotes, in differing degrees, the practises of neoliberalism from its variant 
communicative outlets, as a competing market entity it also reinforces neoliberalism 
through its various economic transactions.
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The Network Society
The rise of transnational telecommunications and in particular the Internet has provided 
another vehicle for the continuing success of neoliberalism. Furthermore, it perhaps 
more than any other factor, adds to the societal project of globalisation of the sort that is 
hailed by libertarians. At the same time it also provides us perhaps with the most 
contradictory aspect of the neoliberal project and is proving to be something of an 
enigma for scholars in general. In terms of GPE, increased network communication has 
led to a marked increase in business transaction and has greatly contributed to the 
opening up of markets, with budding entrepreneurs from differing regions across the 
globe eager to get ‘connected’ to maximise their assets. It has also been the catalyst for 
the transformation towards the ‘new’ economy or ‘knowledge’, signalling a 
metaphorical death-knell to the dominant industrial-relationship of the post-war Fordist 
model, prompting some to suggest that the technological transformation is so great that 
it can only be comparable to the Industrial Revolution (Castells, 1996, 1997, 1998). 
Alongside this synopsis that the Internet has greatly homogenised global society are 
empirical claims that it is increasingly polarising global society, with its unequal 
development just being evident not just at macro level, but within states themselves. 
This movement has created a so-called ‘digital divide’ that seeks to further materialist 
inequality resulting in an increase at the micro level of community disintegration and an 
increase in instability at the workplace (Castells, 1996). At the global level this is even 
greatly emphasized with the developed world (and the US in particular) advancing 
technology at such a pace to further alienate those playing catch-up in the developing 
world.
As mentioned above the Internet remains a paradox ideologically because it 
allows diverse dissident movements that are discontent with the status quo to advertise 
their views, thus giving them access to a wider audience. Authoritarian States in certain 
areas may attempt to counter this by stemming public access to such ‘sites’, and Liberal 
Democracies in the West may attempt to do likewise with subversive right-wing 
material, but the general trend is for politically-orientated sites to regulate themselves, 
within the political economy of the net, allowing state authorities to spend time 
concentrating on policing the more socially derogatory practices that flourish within 
cyber-space. Whilst counter-ideological groups can, through the Internet, provide an 
outlet for expressing their concerns and can organised themselves for demonstrations, 
protests etc, they still lack real advertising ‘clout’, as with the depth of information that 
is contained within the World Wide Web, the only real attention such sites receive is 
from those already familiar with such concerns.
Whilst deregulation has added towards a rapid expansion of private-firm activity 
in the global media, the mass deregulation of the telecommunication industry has also 
allowed leading Internet server firms overtake the top media players, in terms of sales 
and profits (Herman and McChesney, 1997). However, it is the societal effects and their 
contribution towards the hegemonic order that are of greatest importance. The Internet is 
continuing at an increasing rapid rate to provide a suitable and greatly deregulated outlet 
for business and consumers to trade, further normalising market principles. In response, 
states are finding it more and more difficult to provide a mechanism to halt or slow 
down this process that they or at least the more powerful states themselves prompted, 
through their original policy-making.
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STATE AND PARTY RESPONSES TO GLOBALISATION
Another field of interest that requires some focus is how states, and in particularly, 
political parties of the centre-left have responded to these transformations. How, for 
example have the social-democratic Parties of Western Europe responded and 
legitimised this process. In addition why has Communist Cuba become integrated into 
the neoliberal system and joined the WTO? Or why has China legitimised extensive 
market reform that has served to strengthen neoliberal capitalism? How indeed has 
Russia, in its post-Soviet era responded to the constraints of the global economy? This 
final section looks both at how major political parties, and former (and current) socialist 
states, ideologically constructed to contest the rhetoric of liberal capitalism, have 
adapted themselves towards acceptances of its overall programme.
The Third Way
Within western European States, the US and even in some parts of Latin America and 
beyond, left-of-centre parties have been turning increasingly to the phenomennon, which 
is known as the ‘third way’ (Beck, 1997; Giddens, 1994, 1998; Cardose, 2001; Hutton, 
1996). Third way politics can be seen as an attempt top legitimise neoliberalism, by 
directing its benefits to those who became increasingly marginalized at its onset. It is 
thus an attempt to apply the wealth-generating formula, created by competitive big 
business, to the more left-of-centre virtues of social inclusion, citizenship and poverty 
alleviation. By attempting to form alliances with big business, third-way-style 
governments apply public-private incentives towards job creation and public services. In 
this way, they are not too dissimilar from the aims of some of the global economic 
institutions (see above), as they attempt to combine the profit-orientated notions of 
competition with state funding for active results.
The ushering in of ‘third-way’ styled politics has tended to differ from country to 
country, dependent upon both the political philosophy and the extent of neoliberal 
revolution in that country. For example in the US (recognised solely as yet with the 
Clinton administration), the Reagan policies of tax-cuts and competitive privatisation 
were welcomed by the Democrats in the early 1990s, whilst in Europe, where centre-left 
parties have been associated with social democracy, there has been a attempt to redefine 
the intentions of social democracy itself, so that it appeases the overall economic 
conditions of neoliberalism. Most prominent here has been the ‘Blair-Schroder’ 
partnership within Germany and the UK, which has been keen to stress the modernising 
movements within the process of social democracy (Blair and Schroder, 1999). Within
both the Social Democratic Party in Germany and the Labour Party in the UK, 
globalisation and trade liberalisation have become important features in their respective 
party policies, with an enhanced belief that market economics with a social conscience 
can be used as a greater regulatory force in managing the direction of the global market. 
Indeed, domestically, both have embarked upon welfare reform projects, and have 
placed an emphasis upon the public-private partnership towards factors such as public 
services and industrial incentives to aid job creation. This, they argue provides both an 
ideological and practical purpose as social democratic goals such as full employment are 
being targeted, whilst the norms of the hegemonic order are both accepted and further 
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consolidated. The Blair-Schroder project has been aided by think tanks both in Germany 
and the UK, and third way politics as a global project has become rhetorically 
recognised by the two texts written by Anthony Giddens; The Third Way (in 1998) and
the reflective follow up, The Third Way and its Critics (2000). Here Giddens has moved 
from the critical sociological positions that he shared with Beck and others (Beck, 1997; 
Lash and Urry, 1987) within the field of social enquiry, to embark categorically upon an 
explicit set of suggestive programmes that clearly define the aims of the ‘Third Way’. 
Within these aims he proclaims Marx and the Keynesian-mixed economy all but ‘dead’, 
and presents the Durkheimian interpretations of citizenship, democracy and societal 
inclusion and equality as viable alternatives for the future of social democracy. Gidden’s 
argues that this switch of focus is vital for parties of the left, as it provides realistic 
incentives for regulating (but not discouraging) corporate power and for commitments to 
such factors as ecological concerns and poverty alleviation. Gidden’s work has been 
well-received not just in Europe, where Prodi, amongst others has suggested that his 
guide-books provide useful insights for the development and future purpose of the EU, 
but in countries such as Mexico and Brazil, where the suggested strategies for 
development have been equally hailed (Cardoso, 2001). Within his native Britain, Tony 
Blair has taken to his recent work with great vigour; indeed some of Blair’s speeches, 
particularly those that address welfare reform and globalisation, often seem as if they are 
being read directly from extracts from the two books.
Giddens and the increasing number of Third Way theorists see the ‘third way’ as 
a global project, both in terms of its political economy and in its force as a democratic 
agent. They argue that its rhetoric is the only method of providing a regulated check on 
the forces of globalisation, and in turn presenting a forum in which the positive forces of 
globalisation can thrive (Giddens, 1998; Held and Koenig-Archibugi, 2003). Measures 
devised to protect ecology from the potentially dangerous threats of self-destructive 
technological advancements and to reform the geo-politics of the state-system have been 
forwarded, which, they believe, will contribute to the institutional cementation of the 
ideals of cosmopolitan democracy (Plender, 1999).3 Similarly, the formation of civil 
society, along the lines devised by the third way, has to be formulated as a global 
project, in order to globalise the aims of promoting citizen solidarity in harmony with 
global capitalism. Thus Third Way theorists and pragmatics endorse the continued 
construction of democratic global institution, with formations such as the European 
Union, universal judiciary rulings, global ecological management and greater economic 
coordination towards regulation, acting to meet these aims. In practical terms, third-way 
influenced parties in Europe, the US and beyond have proposed a willingness to unify 
towards greater global cooperation and governance, which have included a proposed 
new democratic ‘vision’ of Europe by Blair and Schroder, and a greater willingness to 
fight global inequalities by refocusing the aims of GATT and the World Bank. In 
addition, alternative measures (such as the formulation of the Tobin Tax or an Economic 
Security Council) have been proposed in order to create a form of regulatory structure 
for the 21st Century. This would place the problems of inequality as its main concern, 
and call for the establishment of global and national regulations upon corporations, 
which apply ‘negative capitalism’ by attempting to exploit the workings of the free 
market.
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Whilst, third way theorists, especially Giddens have been keen to spell out their 
visions to their practical contemporaries in a foolproof form, the third way itself 
provides us with little more theoretical and logistic substance than those promoted by 
the WTO. Whilst the ‘Third-Wayers’ may claim to have invented a unique form of 
politics that transcends the standard forms of neoliberalism, in hindsight their aims and 
objectives do not differ very much from those advocates of Smith and Ricardo in the 
affirmation that global free trade is essential for the aspiration of wealth in developing 
countries. In summary, the third-way has merely sought to further legitimise the overall 
practices of neoliberalism, but has tried to promote it differently from its more centre-
right opponents as a tool that could, if regulated properly, solve some of the social-
democratic riddles that have dogged centre-left parties for generations.
(Post) State Socialist Interpretations 
Globalisation has given rise to different interpretations and to different reactions in those 
nations, which have had a history of resistance to western projects. Whilst the fall of the 
Soviet Union also brought an end to the alternative socialist market that was set up 
between State Socialist countries during the cold war, certain States still make claim to 
be socialist, despite their involvement with market economics. Out of these, only North 
Korea seems to retain the conviction to entirely reject the neoliberal order, having made 
great steps to maintain high security to stem off any attempts to open up the country to 
global capitalism. Having reject any thoughts of entering capitalist global clubs, like the 
WTO, North Korea, while managing to retain some of its trading partners, has largely 
suffered from the lack of support that it received at the height of state socialism. Its 
response has thus been to shut-off from the rest of the world, placing faith in its 
nationalist planned economy. The case of North Korea demonstrates the humanitarian 
dangers of ignoring free trade on a micro-level. Whilst its economy has not been helped 
by the lavish over-spending of Kim Jong Il in terms of propaganda (McCormack, 1993), 
its reliance on self-sufficiency in the wake of the fall of the Soviet Union has led to a 
devastating effect on the livelihood of the North Korean citizen, with mass famines, 
starvation and poverty being the ultimate price for the rejection of market reform.
Whilst, North Korea has continued to place its trust in the state socialist mode of 
production, both China and Cuba have entered and contributed towards the neoliberal 
order but both package this in different ways. Cuba, for example has already gained full 
membership to the WTO, consequently becoming embroiled within the hegemonic 
process. The move, whilst accepted by the Cuban government as ‘necessary’, has not 
been seen as progressive. Fidel Castro, himself has agued that whilst it would be 
derogatory a la North Korea to ignore and opt-out of such trading forums, the processes 
of free trade and globalisation themselves are causing profound inequalities, which need 
to be contested at a macro-level (Castro and Deutschmann, 2000). China, on the other-
hand, to the delight of the neoliberal activists in the west, views market reform in an 
ideologically favourable light. The Communist Party welcomes liberal economics and 
even legitimises it as a stage within the socialist mode of development (Shrik, 1994). By 
keeping a form of control on the economy, while opening it up to foreign investment, 
China has moved towards greatly contributing to the global economy as a whole, but 
without placing constraints upon the legitimisation of the Communist regime as a whole.
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Russia’s response to globalisation has followed a more problematic path, than those 
states that have retained one-party status. In particular, Yeltsin’s radical ‘economic-
shock’ programme initiated in the early 1980s, led to both a series of disastrous 
economic crashes and resulted in a mass consortium of narrow and corrupt ownership of 
the economy. In addition, both the consequences of these liberalisation policies and the 
growth of democratic procedures, aided a resurgence of neo-Communist and nationalist 
sentiment within Russia. Combined with the electoral success of the Communists and 
Nationalists and with the growth of unemployment, Yeltsin made attempts to pacify his 
western-orientated position by including a greater emphasis of nationalist rhetoric within 
his policies, without compromising his overall objective of greater involvement within 
the global political economy. However despite this shift in the Yelstin administration, 
the chaotic nature of Russian political society during the 1990s, provided a collection of 
ideologically contrasting groups and movements, that each sought to construct their own 
hegemonic projects, based upon how they saw the sociological foundations of the 
Russian state and in its relationship with the world (Lester, 1995; Tsygankov, 2003). 
These ranged from the nationalist and neo-Communist stance that Russia was 
fundamentally incompatible with the west and should reject any forms of economic 
liberalisation and moves towards joining the WTO, to those who believed that Russia 
should embark more vigorously towards privatisation and seek to gain rapid entrance of 
the WTO.
The Putin administration has found more success in attempting to construct a 
consensual dominant ‘middle-ground’ within Russian political society. By initiating a 
series of political and economic reforms, Putin aims to find a more single-minded vision 
of Russia, one that both promotes the cultural and national essence of ‘Russian 
exceptionalism’, and contributes to the dominant features of the global political 
economy. Thus, Putin’s overall political objective is to adopt a posture that integrates 
Russia fully into the WTO and to the politics of neoliberalism, without neglecting 
Russia’s historical traditions of ‘statism’, ‘patriotism’ and ‘social solidarity’ (Lovell, 
2001). Putin’s plans have been greatly aided from recent developments that saw his 
Unity Party merge with the Fatherland bloc (the third most represented political bloc in 
the Duma), that may provide the impetus to further marginalize any ideological 
opposition and subsequently harmonise Russia’s position towards global neoliberal 
development.
CONCLUSION
This paper has attempted to ‘make sense’ of the development of global neoliberalism by 
adopting a neo-Gramscian analysis to deconstruct the various ideological and practical 
super-structural agencies that aid its develop. In addition it fundamentally rejects the 
redundant notion that globalisation exists as an irreversible force, that appears external 
to both state and institutional actors. Here, the claim often made is that states and 
institutions need to face up to the realities of globalisation, so that it can be regulated 
towards a greater, global purpose. Rather, as I have outlined here, such movements 
merely preside to strengthen and consolidate the overall ideological legitimacy of the 
neoliberal project – thus further alienating and disassociating those actors from tackling 
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the problems and inequalities that it provides, and in addition furthering the myth that 
globalisation appears as a supranational independent force. The main focus is this 
enquiry has thus been to demonstrate how different and diverse economic, political and 
institutional instruments have both constructed and moved to stabilise the working 
ideological formula of neoliberalism. This in turn has transformed social and class 
relations to the extent that they have articulated contrasting sociological mechanisms to 
pacify the relationship with the changing means of production. As observed by Stuart 
Hall:
(Articulation) enables us to think how an ideology empowers people, 
enabling them to make some sense… of their historical situation, 
without reducing those forms of intelligibility to their socio-economic 
or class location or social position (Hall, 1996: p. 142).
The practices of neoliberalism and globalisation have thus provided a set of 
cultural, socio-economic and political norms that have been articulated towards forms of 
common sense. Despite this, the paradox of the overall workings of neoliberalism is that 
it ‘both stimulates and weakens the forces of resistance’ (Gills, 2000). Indeed, the 
technological transformation, that has become a dynamic feature of globalisation has 
activated various resistance groups and movements, and allowed a greater forum for 
them to ideological contest the economic global order. A variety of ‘progressive’, 
‘populist’, ‘anarchist’, ‘socialist’ and ‘nationalist’ contestations have all been aired, 
discussed and digested by scholars and reporters alike (Gills, 2000; Rupert, 2000; 
Worth, 2002). The events of 9-11 provide perhaps the best example of this. Here, the 
consequences of de-regulation have allowed movements, which are radically opposed to 
globalisation – in this case extremist fundamentalism and the belief that globalisation is 
a ‘western-imperialist plot’ aimed at eradicating alternative cultures – use tools of 
communication that have resulted from globalisation, in order to organise themselves for 
subversive action.
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